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Abstract: We analyze the consequences of counseling provided to job seekers in a 
standard job search and matching model. It turns out that neglecting 
equilibrium effects induced by counseling can lead to wrong conclusions. In 
particular, counseling can increase steady state unemployment although 
counseled job seekers exit unemployment at a higher rate than the non-
counseled. Dynamic analysis shows that permanent and transitory policies can 
have effects of opposite sign on unemployment. 
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1 Introduction
Most policy evaluations are based on comparing the behavior of participants and non participants
in the policy. But the di¤erences in outcome between the treatment group and the control group
do estimate the policy mean impact only if the outcomes of the control group are not inuenced
by the policy, the so-called no-interference (Rubin, 1978) or stable unit treatment value
(Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996) assumption. However, the policy may have equilibrium
e¤ects that a¤ect the untreated altogether. For instance, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)
strikingly illustrate this point in the context of education policies. This issue, which is discussed
in a broader perspective in the survey of Meghir (2006), is particularly relevant to the evaluation
of labor supply based policies (such as increasing incentives or monitoring the unemployed).
First, they generally aim at increasing the overall number of lled jobs, which depends on
the interactions between aggregate labor supply and labor demand. Second, these policies may
induce displacement e¤ects: treated persons may crowd out the untreated because they compete
for the same jobs.
Although they have been long recognized, these questions have received limited attention
to date. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) and Calmfors (1994) are early contributions. More
recently, Lise, Seitz and Smith (2005) study the equilibrium e¤ects of the Self-Su¢ cient Project
incentive program in Canada. They calibrate an equilibrium model of the labor market so
that, when used in partial equilibrium, the model matches the e¤ect of the program estimated
by direct comparison of treated and untreated. When equilibrium e¤ects are simulated, the
impact of the SSP is far lower. In contrast, Albrecht, van den Berg and Vroman (2005) nd,
using a calibrated model, equilibrium e¤ects of a Swedish training program to be stronger than
implied by direct comparison. The previous results obtained with calibrated models are not fully
backed by the empirical evaluations, conducted by Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen
(2004), of the New Deal for Young People in the U.K. Based on di¤erent choice of control groups
(unemployed in non pilot areas or ineligible unemployed in treated areas), they nd that direct
and equilibrium evaluations provide similar results. Using a job search and matching model
with skilled and unskilled workers, Van der Linden (2005) shows that micro and equilibrium
evaluations are likely to di¤er widely when job search e¤ort and wages are endogenous. When
wages are bargained over, raising the e¤ectiveness of or the access to counseling programs pushes
wages upwards and leads to lower search e¤ort among nonparticipants. Induced e¤ects can
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outweigh positive micro e¤ects on low-skilled employment when the response of wages is taken
into account.
The aim of our paper is to analyze the impact of counseling in the standard matching
model of the labor market (Pissarides, 2000). In our specication, counseled unemployed have a
constant comparative advantage in the job search. Using this simple model allows us to analyze
the consequences of counseling in a dynamic set-up whereas previous studies are limited to the
comparison of steady states. More precisely, we shed some light on three important issues:
(i) What is the true impact of the policy when equilibrium e¤ects are taken into account?
The model shows that the true impact of counseling can be very di¤erent from what can be
concluded when equilibrium e¤ects are neglected even when the treatment group is small. For
instance, we nd that counseling can increase unemployment when a small proportion of job
seekers benet from counseling, although counseling improves the e¢ ciency of job search.1
(ii) What is the impact of the generalization of the policy to a large treatment group? The
model shows that there is no simple answer. In particular, the relation between the impact of
the policy on unemployment and the size of the treatment group is not monotonous. Strikingly,
in our framework, unemployment increases with the size of the treatment group when a small
share of job seekers are treated but diminishes with the size of the treatment group when a
su¢ ciently large share of job seekers are counseled.
(iii) What is the dynamic impact of counseling? Many experimentations made to evaluate
labor market policies are transitory. Typically, a group of job seekers is selected to benet from
counseling (the treatment group) and the control group will never benet from counseling. The
comparison between the outcomes yields the evaluation of the impact of counseling. Our model
allows us to stress that the consequences of permanent and transitory policies can be very dif-
ferent. The di¤erence comes from the reaction of non-counseled job seekers. When the policy is
transitory, non-counseled workers do not expect to benet from counseling in the future. How-
ever, when the policy is permanent, the expectation to benet from counseling in the future
induces the non-counseled workers to raise in their reservation wage. In our framework, this
phenomenon implies that permanent counseling increases unemployment when a small share of
job seekers are counseled whereas counseling always decreases unemployment when it is transi-
1Our results rely ont the adjustment of wages as in the paper of Van der Linden (2005). However, Van der
Linden assumes that wages are collectively bargained over, whereas we assume an individual bargaining framework
where counseled and non-counseled workers can get di¤erent wages.
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tory. Accordingly, it can be misleading to conclude that a truly successful transitory policy will
remain successful when it will become permanent.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 1. Section 2 is devoted
to the impact of counseling in steady state. Transitory dynamics is analyzed in section 3.
2 The model
We consider a standard matching model à la Pissarides (2000) with a continuum of innitely-
lived risk neutral workers. The measure of the continuum is normalized to one. There are two
goods: a good produced and consumed, which is the numeraire, and labor. There is a common
discount rate r; strictly positive. Time is continuous. Workers can be in three di¤erent states:
(1) employed, (2) unemployed and counseled, (3) unemployed and not counseled. Upon entering
unemployment, workers are not counseled. They then enter into counseled status at a rate  > 0
and they keep on receiving counseling until they nd a job.
There is an endogenous number of jobs. Each job can be either vacant or lled. Filled jobs
produce y > 0 units of the numeraire good per unit of time, whereas vacant jobs cost c per unit
of time. Filled jobs are destroyed with probability  > 0 per unit of time.
Vacant jobs and unemployed workers (the only job seekers, by assumption) are brought
together in pairs through an imperfect matching process. This process is represented by the
customary matching function, which relates total contacts per unit of time to the seekers on
each side of the market. Let us denote by un and uc the number of non-counseled and counseled
unemployed workers respectively. In our set-up, the only potential e¤ect of counseling is to
increase the arrival rate of job o¤ers to the counseled unemployed workers. Let us normalize
to one the number of e¢ ciency units of job search per unit of time of each non-counseled
unemployed worker. Counseled unemployed workers are assumed to produce a di¤erent number
of e¢ ciency units of search, denoted by   1: In this setting, the number of e¢ ciency units of
job search per unit of time amounts to s = un + uc:
The number of employer-worker contacts per unit of time is given by M (s; v)  0, where
v  0 denotes the number of job vacancies and M is the matching function, twice continuously
di¤erentiable, increasing, concave in both of its arguments, and linearly homogeneous. Linear
homogeneity of the matching function allows us to express the probability per unit of time for
a vacant job to meet an unemployed worker as a function of the labor market tightness ratio,
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 = v=s. A vacant job meets on average M (s; v) =v = q () unemployed workers per unit of
time, with q0 () < 0. Similarly, the rate at which counseled and non counseled unemployed job
seekers can meet jobs is q () and q () respectively.
Parameter  is estimated by econometricians who evaluate the impact of counseling by
comparing the exit rate out of unemployment of counseled workers and the exit rate out of
unemployment of non-counseled workers assuming that the arrival rate of job o¤ers to the non-
counseled workers is not inuenced by counseling. Henceforth, we assume that  has been
correctly evaluated in this way. The model allows us to analyze the impact of counseling on the
non-counseled workers and on labor market equilibrium.
2.1 Job creation
Let Jc and Jn be the present-discounted value of expected prot from an occupied job with a
counseled worker and a non-counseled worker respectively. Let V denotes the present-discounted
value of expected prot from a vacant job. V satises
rV =  c+ q() [Jc + (1  )Jn   V ] + _V ;
where _V denotes the time derivative of V and
 =
uc
uc + un
stands for the probability to meet a counseled worker. The free entry condition for the supply
of vacant jobs is V = 0 at any date, implying that
c
q()
= Jc + (1  )Jn: (1)
Let us denote by wc and wn the wage of a counseled worker and of a non-counseled worker
respectively. The asset value of a job lled with a counseled worker, Jc; satises
rJc = y   wc + (V   Jc) + _Jc: (2)
Similarly, the asset value of a job lled with a non-counseled worker, Jn; satises
rJn = y   wn + (V   Jn) + _Jn: (3)
At this stage, it can be shown that the impact of counseling on the arrival rate of job o¤ers
to the non-counseled depends on the wages wc and wn:
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2.2 The impact of counseling when wages are exogenous
Let us assume for a while that wages wc and wn are exogenous. Then, equations (2) and
(3), which dene the asset value of lled jobs, imply that Jc = (y   wc)=(r + ) and Jn =
(y   wn)=(r + ): Substituting these expressions into the free entry condition (1) yields
c(r + )
q()
= y   [wc + (1  )wn] : (4)
It turns out that increases in the share of counseled workers increase the probability  that
rms meet counseled workers. Then, equation(4) shows that increases in  reduce the labor
market tightness (and then the exit rate out of unemployment of the non-counseled, equal to
q()) if the wage of counseled workers is higher than the wage of the non-counseled . In this
case, increases in the share of counseled workers raise the proportion of high paid workers.
Then, expected prots decrease and rms post less job vacancies. If counseled workers get
lower wages than non-counseled workers, we get the opposite result: counseling increases labor
market tightness. When wages are identical, labor market tightness is independent of the share
of counseled workers. This may be the case when there is a minimum wage that is binding for
both counseled and non-counseled workers.
The analysis of the case where wages are exogenous allows us to stress the role played by
wage adjustment. In our simple search and matching model where workers are ex-ante identical,
counseling may have an impact on labor market tightness, and then on the arrival rate of job
o¤ers to the non-counseled workers, if it induces wage di¤erentials between the counseled and
the non-counseled.
2.3 Wage bargaining
Let us now suppose that wages are bargained over. One needs to dene the workers returns
when employed and unemployed in order to derive the outcome of the wage bargaining. The
present-discounted value of the expected income stream of, respectively, a counseled and a non-
counseled unemployed, is denoted by Uc and Un: The present-discounted value of the expected
income stream of employees who found a job while counseled is denoted by Wc. The present
discounted value of the employees who obtained a job without being counseled is denoted by
Wn: All unemployed workers enjoy some instantaneous return z which includes unemployment
benets and the imputed return of leisure. The non-counseled exit unemployment at rate q()
5
and enter into counseling at rate : The counseled exit unemployment at rate q(): Hence
Un; Uc;Wn and Wc satisfy
rUn = z + (Uc   Un) + q()(Wn   Un) + _Un; (5)
rUc = z + q()(Wc   Uc) + _Uc; (6)
rWn = wn + (Un  Wn) + _Wn; (7)
rWc = wc + (Un  Wc) + _Wc: (8)
We assume that the wage bargaining outcome yields a share  of the surplus of the job to
the worker. The surplus of a job lled by a previously counseled worker is
Sc =Wc   Uc + Jc   V:
The surplus of a job lled by a worker who did not benet from counseling is
Sn =Wn   Un + Jn   V:
The surplus sharing rule reads
Wi   Ui = Si; Ji   V = (1  )Si; i = c; n: (9)
The outcome of the wage bargaining being dened, it becomes possible to derive the set of
equations that denes the value of endogenous variables in equilibrium.
2.4 Labor market equilibrium
Using the sharing rule, the denitions of the surpluses and equations (5) through (8) we can
write
(r + )Sc   _Sc = y   z   q()Sc   ; (10)
(r + )Sn   _Sn = y   z   q()Sn   ; (11)
where  =Wc  Wn > 0 satises
(r + )  _ = q()(Sc   Sn): (12)
Equations (10), (11) and (12) comprise four unknow variables: Sc; Sn;  and : Using the free
entry condition (1) together with the sharing rule (9), we obtain a relation between the labor
market tightness  and the surpluses which involves two more unknown un and uc :
c
q()(1  ) =
un
uc + un
Sn +
uc
uc + un
Sc: (13)
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Then, the relations between the labor market tightness and the unemployment rates are derived
from the law of motion of un and uc; which read
_un = (1  un   uc)  un   q()un (14)
_uc = un   q()uc: (15)
Finally, the system of six equations from (10) to (15) comprises six unknown variables
Sn; Sc; ;; un; uc: Although this system of six equations cannot be simplied into a system
with a smaller dimension, it allows us to examine some consequences of counseling on the ar-
rival rate of job o¤ers to the non-counseled. This can be conveniently done by looking at the
case where there is a pool of counseled workers and where the entry rate into counseling, ;
equals zero. In that case, the number of counseled workers decreases at rate q(): Equations
(10) and (11) show that the surplus of jobs lled with counseled workers is smaller than the
surplus of jobs lled with non-counseled workers.2 The surplus of job lled with counseled work-
ers is smaller because the reservation wage of counseled workers is higher than the reservation
wage of non-counseled workers. Therefore, rms make less prots when they are matched with
counseled workers rather than with non-counseled. Hence, as shown by equation (11), the labor
market tightness is reduced when more workers are counseled. This induces less job o¤ers to the
non-counseled. This phenomenon is amplied when the entry rate into counseling, , is positive,
because the perspective to be counseled in the future pushes upward the reservation wage of
non-counseled workers, which is detrimental to job creation.
3 Policy evaluation in steady state
In this section we calibrate the model and we analyze the equilibrium e¤ect of counseling in
steady state.
2When  > 1; Sn is necessarily larger than Sc. Suppose that this is not the case, so that Sc  Sn;then Sc > Sn.
From equations (10), (11) and (12), we obtain the folowing expession:
(r + )(Sc   Sn) =   r + 
r + 
q()(Sc   Sn)
which implies that Sc < Sn; which is incompatible with the assumption that Sc  Sn: This enables us to conclude
that Sc < Sn.
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3.1 Calibration
The frequency of the model is monthly. The 3 month interest rate is set to 1.2 percent, which
makes the monthly discount factor equal to 0.996. We need to specify the matching function:
q () = q0
 We choose a conservative value for the elasticity  = 0:5. The bargaining power 
is set equal to  to ensure that the Hosios condition is fullled. We want to reproduce features
of the French labour market (means are taken from 2000 to 2007, which correponds to the
last business cycle). The instantaneous return of unemployment, z; is equal to 60 percent of
the productivity y; which value is normalized to one. This implies a replacement ratio (z over
w) slightly above 60 percent since wages take values around 0:96 in equilibrium. The mean
unemployment duration, measured in the Labor Force Survey (Enquête emploi) between 2004
and 2005, is 1:07 year. The monthly exit rate out of unemployment consistent with this mean
unemployment duration is ess = 7:80 percent. The overall unemployment rate averaged 9:5
percent over the same time period.
To compute the baseline equilibrium, we assume that there is no counseling so that  = uc =
0 and un = 0:095. The separation rate is thus  = 0:8 percent. The cost of posting a vacancy
is set to be roughly one third of a period production c = 0:3y.
The value of parameter q0 of the matching function is determined by the following relation
q0 =
c
y   z (ess)
=(1 )

(r + + ess)
1
1  
1 
:
3.2 Policy experiment
In this subsection, we look at the consequences of the introduction of a counseling policy that
improves the e¢ ciency of the search activity of counseled workers. We assume that non-counseled
workers produce one unit of search per unit of time, so that their arrival rate of job o¤ers
amounts to q(): In line with the estimations of Crepon et al. (2005), we assume that the
counseled produce  = 1:2 unit of search per unit of time, so that their arrival rate of job o¤ers
is 1:2 q():
3.2.1 The impact of counseling on unemployment
Figure 1 displays the relation between the unemployment rate and the share of counseled workers
in steady state. It is striking that steady state unemployment increases with the share of
counseled workers when this share is small, below 10 percent. This result shows that a naive
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Figure 1: The relation between the unemployment rate (y-axis) and the share of counseled
workers (x-axis).
evaluation, relying on a simple comparison of the outcomes of participants and non participants
that neglects equilibrium e¤ects, can lead to the wrong conclusion that counseling decreases
unemployment, especially when the share of counseled workers is small.
Obviously, the negative impact of counseling on unemployment comes from its e¤ect on the
arrival of job o¤ers to the non-counseled. Figure 2 shows that the arrival rate of job o¤ers to the
non-counseled decreases with the share of counseled workers. The drop in the baseline arrival
rate of job o¤ers, q(); is the result of two e¤ects. First, there is a decrease in protability
due to the new composition of the unemployed population. Because the counseled get higher
wages than the non-counseled,3 a spread of counseling reduces protability, this composition
e¤ect hinders job creation. Formally, if we di¤erentiate the free entry condition (4), we get:
3Recall that the counseled get higher wages because counseling enhances their exit rate out of unemployment
and then their reservation wage.
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Figure 2: The relation between the arrival rate of job o¤ers to non-counseled workers (y-axis)
and the share of counseled workers (x-axis).
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 c(r + )q
0()
(q())2
@
@
=  @
@
(wc   wn) 


@wc
@
+ (1  )@wn
@

:
The rst term of the right-hand side corresponds to the composition e¤ect. The second e¤ect,
which shows up in the second term, comes from the adjustment of wages (see Figure 3). The
wage of non-counseled workers is pushed upward by counseling because non-counseled workers
anticipate that they may benet from counseling in the future. In contrast, the wage of counseled
workers diminishes with the entry rate into counseling because the opportunity cost of accepting
job o¤ers is higher when few job seekers are counselled. More precisely, counseling creates an
opportunity cost of accepting job o¤ers: counseled job seekers who nd jobs can loose them and
will then have to wait a while before beneting from counseling again. This opportunity cost
is higher when the probability to be counseled again, after the accepted job is lost, is lower.
Thefore, the opportunity cost to accept a job, and then the negotiated wage, is higher when the
entry rate into counseling is smaller.
Finally, the composition and the wage e¤ects result in a negative impact of counseling on
the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers, q(); as shown by Figure 2.
The decline in the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers induced by counseling tends to drive the
unemployment rate upwards. This e¤ect competes with the direct e¤ect of counseling which
makes counseled job seekers leaving unemployment faster. When the share of counseled workers
is small, the rst e¤ect dominates: the share of non-counseled workers who are adversely a¤ected
is large and counseled workers gets very high wages. When the share of counseled workers is
large, the second e¤ect dominates: even if counseled workers are numerous, they get lower wages
than when they are fewer.
3.2.2 Welfare analysis
Our model allows us to yield a welfare analysis. In our context, where workers are risk neutral,
instantaneous social welfare is merely equal to the production of employees, (1   u)y, plus the
production of the unemployed, uz; minus the cost of job vacancies, cv: Assuming that counseling
is provided at zero cost, we nd that counseling more unemployed always enhances social welfare,
as shown by Figure 4. It is worth noting that social welfare increases with the share of counseled
workers even when counseling increases unemployment. We also nd that the welfare of non-
counseled unemployed, Un; increases with the share of counseled workers, although counseling
11
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Figure 3: The relation between the wage of counseled workers (broken line) and the wage of
non-counseled workers (continuous line) (y-axis) and the share of counseled workers (x-axis).
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Figure 4: The relation between instantaneous social welfare (y-axis) and the share of counseled
workers (x-axis).
reduces the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers and then their probability to nd a job. Actually,
non-counseled workers benet from counseling because the drop in the baseline arrival rate of
job o¤ers induced by counseling is compensated by the possibility to be counseled in the future.
Counseled unemployed job seekers, like the non-counseled, are always better o¤ in a world with
counseling than in a world without. However, their welfare, Uc; decreases with the share of
counseled workers.
3.2.3 Evaluation errors
Our model allows us to shed light on the size of the evaluation errors coming from ignoring
equilibrium e¤ects. Standard evaluations, relying on a simple comparison of the outcome of the
treated and the non treated, can lead to wrong results if the policy induces equilibrium e¤ects
which change the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers q(): The error comes from the choice of
wrong counterfactuals when evaluating the impact of the policy: standard evaluations assume
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that the counterfactual arrival rates of job o¤ers to the non treated in the absence of the policy
are the same as those observed by the econometrician in the presence of the policy.
In our model, the exit rate out of unemployment of counseled job seekers amounts to q():
Non treated individuals exit unemployment at rate, q(): The e¤ect of the treatment on the
treated is usually dened as the ratio between these two exit rates, that is : However, this
approach yields a naive evaluation of the e¤ects of the treatment to the extent that it does
not account for equilibrium e¤ects which may change the value of the arrival rate of job o¤ers
to the non counseled job seekers. To account for such e¤ects one needs to know the exit rate
out of unemployment in the absence of counseling, that we denote by 0q(0): Then, the e¤ect
of the treatment on the treated accounting for equilibrium e¤ects is dened as q()=0q(0):
The error induced by the ignorance of equilibrium e¤ects, expressed in percentage of the naive
evaluation , is thus [q()  0q(0)] =0q(0): Figure 5 shows that the naive evaluation leads to
an over estimation of the truee¤ect. The absolute error increases with the share of counseled
workers. It is equal to 4 percent when the share of counseled workers amounts to 20 percent
and goes up to 9 percent when the share goes to one.
Another error can be made when simulating the consequence of the spread of the policy to
all workers. Looking at this error is important to the extent that some policy makers think that
policies should rst be evaluated at a small scale before being generalized if their evaluations are
favorable. This idea is right only if equilibrium e¤ects are properly taken into account. Ignoring
such e¤ects can lead to false conclusions, because it is wrong to simulate the impact of the
generalization of counseling to all job seekers with the assumption that the arrival of job o¤ers
remains unchanged. We can shed light on this type of error by looking at the di¤erence between
the true value of the unemployment rate, denoted by u; and the value of the unemployment rate,
denoted by ~u; computed when it is assumed that the baseline arrival rate remains unchanged,
equal to 0q(0): Figure 6 plots the true unemployment rate, u, (continuous line) and the
unemployment rate computed without accounting for equilibrium e¤ects, ~u.
The evaluation error made when equilibrium e¤ects are neglected also biases cost-benet
analysis based on the welfare criterion presented above. As previoulsy assumed, ignoring gen-
eral equilibrium e¤ects boils down to keeping labor market tightness equal to its value in the
absence of counseling. In that case, a naive prediction of the unemployment rates for a given
treatment intensity can be computed as in the previous paragraph (~un(); ~uc(); ~u()). Given
14
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Figure 5: The relation between the error (in percentage of the naive evaluation ) in the eval-
uation of the e¤ect of counseling on the exit rate out of unemployment of counseled workers
(y-axis) and the share of counseled workers (x-axis).
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Figure 6: The relation between the unemployment rate (true unemployment rate: continu-
ous line, equilibrium unemployment rate computed without accounting for equilibrium e¤ects:
broken line) and the share of counseled workers (x-axis).
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Figure 7: The relation between the maximal protable counseling cost (true : continuous line,
computed without accounting for equilibrium e¤ects: broken line) and the share of counseled
workers (x-axis).
these predictions, one can compute the naive net welfare gain from the policy ~!. In the
naive cost-benet analysis, one compares the naive net welfare gain per counseled worker to the
unit cost of counseling.4 Figure 7 shows that the maximal unit cost of counseling that makes
counseling protable is relatively small, equal to 0:066 (recall that the productivity of employees
is normalized to 1). The naive maximal cost above which it is not worth counseling is always
higher than the true maximal cost, that accounts for equilibrium e¤ects. The naive evaluation
over-estimates the e¢ ciency of counseling because it neglects the negative impact of counseling
on the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers.
4The unit cost of counseling is dened as the cost per counseled worker during one unit of time.
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4 Policy evaluation and dynamic adjustment
Up to now, we analyzed the impact of counseling on labor market equilibrium in steady state. It
is also important to keep in mind that most labor market policies induce dynamic adjustements
that take time. Our model allows us to study the dynamic path of the endogenous variables.
We consider three policy experiments that di¤er by the proportion of people being counseled.
In the baseline scenario the entry rate into counseling, ; is equal to 5 percent. There is also
a lightscenario, where  is equal to 1 percent, and an intensivescenario, with an entry rate
into counseling equal to 20 percent. We also consider two versions of these policy experiments.
In the rst, the policy is permanent: the entry rate into counseling remains constant over time
from time t = 0: In the second, it is transitory: some workers enter into counseling at time
t = 0 only. Then, these workers remain counseled until they nd a job and other workers cannot
benet from counseling.5 As in the previous section, in all the simulations, the counseled have a
comparative advantage which increases their relative probability of nding a job by 20 percent
( = 1:2).
4.1 Permanent policy
In the baseline scenario the entry rate into counseling, ; is equal to 5 percent, which entails
that 36 percent of the unemployed are counseled in steady state. In the lightscenario, where
 equals 1 percent, it turns out that 5:2 percent of the unemployed are counseled in steady state.
In the intensivescenario, with an entry rate into counseling equal to 20 percent, 69 percent
of the unemployed are counseled in steady state. Figure 8 shows the dynamics of the share of
counseled workers for the three cases.
Figure 9 shows that the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers decreases monotically with time.
The baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers adjusts more rapidly to its steady state value when the
entry rate into counseling is bigger. However, in all cases considered here, the arrival rate of job
o¤ers is very close to its steady state value after one year.
Figure 10 shows that the unemployment rate dynamics is not always monotonic. There is
an overshooting of the unemployment rate when the share of counseled job seekers is su¢ ciently
large. This phenomenon is the consequence of the interaction between the positive impact
5The simulations are made with the software Dynare (http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/) which necessi-
tates to write the model in discrete time. The discrete time version of the model is presented in appendix.
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Figure 8: The evolution of the share of counseled workers (y-axis) over time (x-axis, in month)
for  = 0:01 (continuous line),  = 0:05 (crosses) and  = 0:2 (circles).
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Figure 9: The evolution of the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers, q(); (y-axis) over time (x-axis,
in month) for  = 0:01 (continuous line),  = 0:05 (crosses) and  = 0:2 (circles).
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of counseling on the entry rate into employment of counseled job seekers and the equilibrium
e¤ects, which reduce the entry rate into employment of the non-counseled. When the entry rate
into counseling is large enough, the drop in the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers, induced by
equilibrium e¤ects, dominates at the beginning, which induces an increase in the unemployment
rate. Then, as time elapses, there are more and more counseled workers whose exit rate out of
unemployment is relatively high.
Figure 10 leads us to stress that it is important to account for the dynamics of the unemploy-
ment rate when evaluating the equilibrium e¤ects of counseling. A priori, it could be possible to
estimate the equilibrium e¤ects of counseling by gathering data on similar employment pools in
which there are di¤erent proportions of counseled individuals. However, this strategy can lead
to very di¤erent conclusions according to the time horizon at which the evaluation is done. In
the baseline scenario, where the entry rate into counseling amounts to 5 percent, the evaluation
of the equilibrium e¤ects 6 months after the introduction of the policy leads to the conclusion
that they increase signicantly unemployment. However, there are no signicant e¤ects on the
unemployment rate beyond two years.
We also compute the dynamics of the evaluation error [tq(t)  0q(0)] =0q(0). The true
treatment e¤ect on the treated is over estimated by the naive evaluation. As shown by gure 9,
the size of the error increases with time because it takes time to increase the number of counseled
workers and then to get sizeable equilibrium e¤ects.
4.2 Transitory policy
Now, we look at situations where some workers benet from counseling at date zero and remain
counseled until they nd a job. The other job seekers, who do not benet from counseling at date
zero, are never counseled. Figure 12 displays the evolution of the share of counseled workers over
time. Figure 13 shows the corresponding evolution of the unemployment rate. It turns out that
counseling always decreases the unemployment rate, contrary to the case where the policy is
permanent. The di¤erence between the two cases comes from the role of the expectations of non-
counseled workers. When the policy is permanent, non-counseled workers anticipate that they
will benet from counseling in the future. Therefore, their reservation wage and then their bar-
gained wage increase (as shown in Figure 3 above). When the policy is transitory, non-counseled
job seekers know that they will never benet from counseling. Therefore, their reservation wage
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Figure 10: The evolution of the unemployment rate (y-axis) over time (x-axis, in month) for
 = 0:01 (continuous line),  = 0:05 (crosses) and  = 0:2 (circles).
21
0 10 20 30 40 50-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Figure 11: The error (in percentage of the naive evaluation ) in the evaluation of the e¤ect of
counseling on the exit rate out of unemployment of counseled workers (y-axis) over time (x-axis,
in month) for  = 0:01 (continuous line),  = 0:05 (crosses) and  = 0:2 (circles).
does not increase. Actually, their reservation wage decreases because the baseline arrival rate
of job o¤ers, q(), drops when some workers are counseled, as shown by Figure 14. Note that
there is a spike in the job o¤er arrival rate at the time of the policy shock. This is due to the
assumption made in the discrete time version of the model presented in appendix. At date zero,
there is no counseled worker ready to be hired since vacant jobs posted at date t are matched
with workers unemployed at date t  1 (recall that unemployment is a predetermined variable).
Moreover, at date zero, non-counseled job seekers reduce their reservation wage because they
anticipate that the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers is going to decrease in the next future. The
combination of this two phenomena increases the value of job vacancies, and then job creation
at date zero. At date one, vacant jobs meet counseled job seekers whose reservation wage is
higher. This is detrimental to job creation, as shown by Figure 14.
The comparison of the impact of transitory and permanent policies highlights the role of
anticipations. When the policy is permanent, it turns out that a non negligeable share of its
impact on the unemployment rate is induced by the reaction of non-counseled job seekers. The
raise in their reservation wage, and then in their bargained wage, induced by the expectation
to benet from counseling in the future dampens job creation. This phenomenon implies that
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Figure 12: The evolution of the share of counseled workers (y-axis) over time (x-axis, in month)
for  = 0:01 (continuous line),  = 0:05 (crosses) and  = 0:2 (circles).
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Figure 13: The evolution of the unemployment rate (y-axis) over time (x-axis, in month) for
 = 0:01 (continuous line),  = 0:05 (crosses) and  = 0:2 (circles).
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Figure 14: The evolution of the baseline arrival rate of job o¤ers, q(); (y-axis) over time
(x-axis, in month) for  = 0:01 (continuous line),  = 0:05 (crosses) and  = 0:2 (circles).
permanent counseling increases unemployment when a small share of job seekers are counseled
whereas counseling always decreases unemployment when it is transitory. Accordingly, it can
be misleading to conclude that a truly successful transitory policy will remain successful when
it will become permanent.
5 Conclusion
Our paper stresses that it is worth accounting for equilibrium e¤ects to provide a proper evalu-
ation of counseling policies. Neglecting such e¤ects could lead to the conclusion that counseling
reduces steady state unemployment although its true e¤ect could be opposite. A striking result
obtained in the paper is that this type of error can arise when the size of the treatment group
is small. It also turns out that it can be wrong to conclude that a truly successful transitory
policy remains successful when it becomes permanent. This result is important to the extent that
many policy evaluations rely on the experimentation of policies on a temporary basis. Typically,
a policy is evaluated during a transitory period. Then, it is often considered that this evalua-
tion provides relevant information to evaluate the e¤ect of the policy that will be implemented
permanently. Our analysis shows that this is not always the case.
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A Appendix: The model in discrete time
The aim of this appendix is to present the discrete time version of the continuous time model presented
in the text. Unemployment rates are predetermined. During period t, matching involve the unemployed
populations inherited from the previous period with the job vacancies posted in period t. To make clear
that unemployment rates are predetermined, we index them by t  1. The timing of events within each
period is the following, production takes place, rms post vacant jobs, jobs and unemployed workers are
matched, jobs are destroyed at rate  and, nally, payments are made. The assumptions about timing
allow us to write the system of six equations from (10) to (15) that denes the equilibrium value of
(Sn; Sc; ;; un; uc) as follows
un;t = [1    tq (t)]un;t 1 +  (1  un;t 1   uc;t 1)
uc;t = [1  tq (t)]uc;t 1 + un;t 1
where t =
vt
uc;t 1 + un;t 1
c
q(t)(1  ) =
un;t 1
uc;t 1 + un;t 1
Sn;t+1 +
uc;t 1
uc;t 1 + un;t 1
Sc;t+1
Sn;t =
1
1 + r
[y   z + [1    tq(t)]Sn;t+1   t+1]
Sc;t =
1
1 + r
[y   z + [1    tq(t)]Sc;t+1   t+1]
t =
1
1 + r
[tm(t)(Sc;t+1   Sn;t+1) + (1  )t+1]
Because agents are risk-neutral per period social welfare can be written as the production net of the
cost of vacant jobs. Thus, we dene the period welfare as:
!t = y(1  un;t 1   uc;t 1) + z(un;t 1 + uc;t 1)  ct(un;t 1 + uc;t 1):
The discounted present value of intertemporal welfare, 
t; writes:

t = !t + 
t+1
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